The question of the UK's relationship with the EU has resurfaced as Keir Starmer's premiership draws to a close and Andy Burnham, his likely successor, prepares to enter No 10.
Wes Streeting, a former contender for the top job and now a possible future chancellor, recently stated that Britain should rejoin the EU.
The rejoin debate in the UK has focused narrowly on two issues: the economic cost of Brexit and the price of rejoining, including whether the UK could regain opt-outs from the Euro and Schengen.
However, this discussion fails to address larger international questions: what has the EU become, and would the UK want to rejoin it?
The EU's Transformation Since Brexit
The EU of 2026 is built on common borrowing, assertive joint industrial policy, and a growing role in security and defence that encroaches on national powers.
It is also moving toward a more assertive stance toward the US and China than that of the British government.
Since the UK left, the EU has changed significantly.
Confronted with crises, the remaining 27 governments have responded with substantial joint debt backed by the EU budget.
To deal with Covid, the EU borrowed €100bn from capital markets to lend to member states for furlough programmes, and later borrowed €750bn for green and digital investment grants.
The US's retreat from its security promise prompted the European Commission to borrow €150bn for defence-industrial collaboration through the Security Action for Europe (Safe) initiative.
Much of the EU's aid to Ukraine has been funded similarly.
This represents a profound shift in European integration. Common borrowing is a form of quasi-political and fiscal integration that Eurosceptics long warned would come.
Had the UK remained, it would likely have opposed such moves, as it often sought to veto or dilute them.
Common debt will be the EU's tool of choice for future shocks. Brussels has proposed a permanent fiscal capacity for the 2028-2034 budget, allowing borrowing whenever needed.
More shared borrowing will necessitate more supranational taxation. The commission is pushing for EU-wide corporate and digital taxes to repay the growing debt.
Industrial Policy and Geopolitical Stance
The EU of 2026 is more interventionist and protectionist regarding its single market.
Its permissive approach to state aid, along with instruments like the proposed Industrial Accelerator Act and Safe, reflects a new willingness to use industrial policy as a geopolitical tool.
Brussels has targeted Chinese overcapacity and restricted US firms' access to EU defence financing through "buy European" requirements to strengthen Europe's industrial base and strategic autonomy.
Historically, UK governments opposed closer European fiscal integration, supranational borrowing, and activist industrial policy, preferring open markets.
Successive British governments also preferred close ties with Washington while balancing hawkish rhetoric on China with economic pragmatism.
The EU's stance toward both the US and China is heading in a more combative direction. The bloc's push for technological sovereignty marks another departure from British instincts.
The commission's tech sovereignty package aims to reduce dependence on Silicon Valley.
While the UK shares some concerns, British governments have been more comfortable within a US-led tech ecosystem.
Artificial intelligence may prove the clearest divergence.
The EU has led with comprehensive regulation, while the UK markets itself as a lighter-touch alternative to attract AI investment.
Institutionally, the EU is moving away from national vetoes.
The arrival of Hungary's new prime minister, Péter Magyar, has provided an opportunity to move toward majority voting in foreign policy, sanctions, and enlargement.
These developments are not necessarily wrong for the EU, nor should they preclude the UK from rejoining or pulling the EU in a more liberal direction from within.
But any serious rejoin debate must start from an honest assessment of what the EU has become.
The real question is no longer whether Britain could recover its old opt-outs and budget rebates, but whether it is prepared to join a union that is more fiscally integrated, interventionist, geopolitical, and less British than the one it left.
